Court holds non-compete clause unenforceable as it is too wide and unreasonable for the patent agent's role.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe court determined that the non-compete clause in the defendant's employment contract was unenforceable due to its excessive geographical and temporal scope. While the clause was applicable, the judge found a prohibition on dealing with all potential customers was unreasonable compared to a restriction on soliciting existing clients. Consequently, the preliminary issue was decided in favor of the defendant, rendering the broad anti-competition provision void.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generierts. 1 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; s. 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: A restraint of trade is unreasonable and unenforceable if it goes beyond what is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertZitierte Rechtsprechung
KI-generiertVerwandte Entscheide
KI-generiertVolltext
2005 IEHC 159
THE HIGH COURT
[2005 No. 490P]
MURGITROYD AND COMPANY LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
AND
BARRY PURDY
DEFENDANT
Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke 1st June, 2005.
1. This case first came before the court when the plaintiff company sought various interlocutory injunctions against the defendant.
That application was the subject of a judgment delivered by me on 14th April, 2005. The most urgent, and indeed difficult, of the
questions which arose at the interlocutory stage concerned the case made by the plaintiffs to the effect that the defendant was
bound by a non competition clause in his contract of employment which they sought to enforce, initially by interlocutory order. As
indicated in my judgment on that occasion I came to the view that the balance of convenience would not favour the grant of an
interlocutory injunction in respect of non competition provided that that aspect of the case could be made ready for trial in a very
short period of time. In those circumstances I directed that a preliminary issue should be tried as to the applicability and
enforceability of the non competition clause. That issue has now come on for trial and this judgment is, therefore, the final judgment
in respect of that aspect of the plaintiff’s case. In the course of a discussion with counsel for both sides immediately following the
delivery of my judgment on 14th April it was agreed that there were three issues as to the applicability and enforceability of the non
competition clause. Before setting out those issues it is necessary to put same into context by outlining both the non disputed facts
and the contentions of the parties in respect of disputed facts.
Factual Context
2. As set out in my judgment of 14th April, 2005 the plaintiff company is engaged in the provision of intellectual property services,
having eight offices spread throughout Europe. The company hired the defendant who is a European patent agent to work out of the
plaintiffs Dublin office. An initial letter of engagement dated 7th February, 2001 was followed by a written service agreement dated
19th February, 2001. Clause 2.2 of that agreement provided that the service agreement was to last for an initial three year period
which was specified as commencing on 30th September, 2001.
3. That same clause of the agreement provided for the possibility of a renewal for a further three years in the following terms:-
“On the Company receiving a written renewal request from the Executive in any September during the course of this
agreement and thereafter unless and until the executive’s employment hereunder shall be determined by either party
given to the other written notice as aforementioned.”
4. In the context of the agreement the defendant is “the Executive”. So far as this preliminary issue is concerned it is also important
to note that the service agreement provided at clause 11 as follows:-
“Undertaking
The Executive will not within the Republic of Ireland during the period of 12 months following determination of his
employment hereunder on his account and in competition with the company carry on any business which competes with
the business of the company or any associated company having intellectual property work as one of its principal objects
existing as of the date of termination of the executive’s employment hereunder and with which the executive shall have
been directly or indirectly concerned PROVIDED THAT nothing contained in this clause shall preclude the executive from
holding at any time any shares or loan capital (not exceeding one per centum of the shares or loan capital of the class
concerned for the time being in issue) in any company whose shares are listed or dealt in on a recognised Stock Exchange
and nothing in this Agreement will affect the Executive’s right to accept employment as an employee in another firm of
patent attorneys”.
5. It is therefore common case that the defendant commenced his employment with the plaintiff on terms that included the above
non competition clause. It is also common case that on 20th December, 2004 the defendant notified the plaintiff that he intended to
leave the plaintiff’s employment. On foot of that notice his employment ended on 19th January, 2005. Immediately thereafter the
plaintiff commenced practising as “Purdy and Associates” at premises at Mespil House, 37 Adelaide Road, Dublin 2. It is not contested
that in establishing the above practice the defendant is competing with the plaintiffs in a manner which would be in breach of the
above clause 11 should that clause remain part of the agreement between the parties as of the date of termination of the defendants
employment and be enforceable.
The Issues
6. The three issues which therefore arise are as follows:
(a) It is suggested by the defendant that on 18th or 19th February, 2002 he, the defendant, called Mr. Keith Young,
Chief Executive of the plaintiff company, on his mobile phone and informed him that he wished to opt out of the service
contract. It is contended by the defendant that an agreement was reached on that occasion to the effect that he would
continue in employment but not under the service agreement. This is denied by the plaintiffs.
(b) Secondly the defendant places reliance upon the fact (which is common case) that the renewal of the service
agreement contemplated by clause 2.2 thereof did not in fact occur. In the circumstances the defendant contends that
the service agreement ceased to have any effect on the expiry of the three year term set out in its terms and thus that
his continued employment after the expiry of that term in September 2004 was not on the basis of the service agreement.
While accepting that there was no formal renewal of the service agreement as contemplated by the above clause the
plaintiff contends that the appropriate interpretation of the continuance of the defendant in employment after the expiry
of the three year period was that all of the terms and conditions previously applicable to his employment under the
service agreement were to continue save that the agreement was no longer for a fixed period but indefinite.
(c) Thirdly the defendant contends that even if he loses on the above two issues so that as of the date of the
termination of his contract of employment the non competition clause was still part of the terms of his employment that
clause is unenforceable as being an unreasonable restraint of trade.
7. I deal with each of those matters in turn.
The Renegotiation
8. There is a significant measure of agreement between the parties as to the background facts relevant to this issue. Mr. Young is
the Chief Executive of the plaintiff company and also company secretary. He agrees that he had a discussion with the defendant in
February 2002 at which the defendant indicated that he did not wish to continue to be bound by the service agreement. What
appears to between Mr. Young and Mr. Purdy is that Mr. Purdy asserts that Mr. Young agreed to release him from the service
agreement whereas Mr. Young suggests that he indicated that he had no opposition to Mr. Purdy being released from the service
agreement provided that Mr. Purdy entered into an appropriate form of contract of employment. It is common case that some days
(or perhaps a small number of weeks) afterwards a standard form contract of employment was forwarded by Mr. Young to Mr. Purdy.
It is also common case that this was never in fact executed by Mr. Purdy and, indeed, that the failure to execute was not simply an
administrative failure to sign a document which represented the terms agreed between the parties. Mr. Purdy’s evidence is that
having taken an initial brief look at the contract when he received it he was then distracted by other work and did not return to the
matter until the issue was raised during 2004 in circumstances to which I will return. It is clear that Mr. Purdy sent an email to Mr.
Young indicating that he had, at that time (that is to say in 2004) just signed the agreement and that it had been sent to Mr. Young
in the company’s internal post. However it seems clear that he did not in fact sign it and that his email was somewhat premature. It is
also clear from his evidence that having read the agreement he was not satisfied to sign it. He indicated that one unspecified
provision contained in the draft agreement was such that he would have been prepared to agree to it. In those circumstances it is
clear that the absence of a formal executed employment agreement was not simply a mere technical oversight on the part of the
parties but stemmed from an absence of agreement as to the terms applicable.
9. Against that background it is necessary to assess the competing accounts as to what happened in February 2002. In support of
the defendant’s contention he draws attention to the fact that at various times in the middle of 2004 the plaintiff company and in
particular Mr. Young acted as if under the impression that Mr. Purdy was employed under a contract of employment rather than under
a service agreement. In particular attention is drawn to email records which appear to show an acceptance by Mr. Young of that
position. However Mr. Young gave evidence that those records were created while he was on holiday and when he did not have
access to his files.
10. Attention is also drawn to the existence of certain records of employees that were prepared by management in the course of
negotiations which sought to “buy out” the entitlements which certain employees had as to a free motor car. The entitlements of
those who were employed under a service agreement differed from those who were employed under a contract of employment and
employee status under that heading was, therefore, of some importance to the position of the buy out of motor car rights. In the
relevant document prepared in the middle of 2004 Mr. Purdy is described as being employed under a contract of employment.
11. There can be little doubt, therefore, that in or around the middle part of 2004 Mr. Young was of the impression that Mr. Purdy
was employed under a contract of employment rather than a contract of service. In many cases that fact would be of vital
importance if not decisive. However it is important to emphasise, on the facts of this case, that what is between the parties is the
question of whether, as Mr. Young asserts, it was indicated to Mr. Purdy that he could terminate his service contract provided he
entered into a standard form employment contract or, as Mr. Purdy asserts, the contract of service was simply discharged. Given the
narrowness of that issue, coupled with the fact that Mr. Young had, it is common case, sent Mr. Purdy a copy of a standard form of
contract, it does not seem to me that the fact that Mr. Young may well have been under the impression that Mr. Purdy had moved to
a contract of employment is of great weight in determining the narrow issue which exists between Mr. Young and Mr. Purdy. It should
finally be noted that there was evidence, which I accept, that the amount of pay to which the motor car rights of various employees
was commuted differed between on the one hand those employees who were on a contract of employment and, on the other hand
those who had a service agreement. Those with a service agreement received a larger sum. Mr. Purdy received the larger sum. It
would thus appear that by the time the matter was resolved the undoubted confusion which existed in Mr. Young’s mind (partly
contributed to by the failure of Mr. Purdy to respond either way to the furnishing to him of the standard form contract of
employment) had been resolved in favour of the view that Mr. Purdy was employed under a service agreement.
12. The other matter relied upon by the defendant concerns the response of senior management in the plaintiff company to his
departure. Evidence was given of various communications at around the time of his departure which wished him well in his new
venture. However I accept Mr. Young’s evidence that it was his understanding (rightly or wrongly) that Mr. Purdy intended to take
some time out before setting up his new venture. It is also probably correct that it was only when a number of clients of the plaintiff
company moved their business to the defendant that particular attention was paid to the obligations of the defendant under his
contract. In all the circumstances I do not believe that it is appropriate to infer from the well wishes to the defendant at the time of
his departure an understanding on the part of his employer that he had been absolved from his obligations under the service
agreement.
13. On the other hand there are, in my view, considerable difficulties with the defendant’s case on this issue. The case which he
made in evidence at the full hearing of this preliminary issue was to the effect that subsequent to his discussions with Mr. Young he
believed himself to be employed on foot of the original letter of engagement of 7th February, 2001. He did not make that case in the
affidavits sworn at the interlocutory stage. However it is difficult to see how that could be the case. The letter of engagement is, in
its terms, subject “to the following terms and conditions and those of a three year service agreement (draft enclosed)”. The letter
goes on to state that Mr. Purdy’s employment might be terminated “as outlined in the service agreement”. It is therefore impossible to
disentangle the letter of engagement from the service agreement. It is hard to see how Mr. Purdy could have been released from the
service agreement but still subject to the letter of engagement. Furthermore, it is common case that no agreement was reached as
to the terms of any contract of employment. If Mr. Purdy’s account is, therefore, to be accepted it was agreed by Mr. Young that he
would continue in employment without any specific terms of employment.
14. In all the circumstances I have come to the view on the balance of probabilities that what was offered to Mr. Purdy, and what he
accepted, in February 2002 was that he could terminate the service agreement on condition that he entered into a standard form
contract of employment (or such a contract with variations that might be agreed in advance between him and the plaintiffs ). While
the plaintiffs, and in particular Mr. Young, may have been under the mistaken impression that such a contract had in fact been
completed that was never, in fact, done. The reason why it was not done was that Mr. Purdy, as he himself said, found certain of the
terms too onerous. Therefore the offer that was made to him was never accepted in the full sense of the word. It was, at most, an
agreement to agree whereby, provided terms for a contract of employment could be agreed and such an agreement put in place he,
Mr. Purdy, would be released from the service agreement. On the basis that no terms for a contract of employment were in fact ever
agreed I am therefore satisfied that any tentative arrangement entered into between the parties in February 2002 did not amount to
a concluded agreement which had the effect of releasing the defendant from the service agreement.
The Continuance of the Agreement in 2004
15. The next point relied upon by the defendant is to draw attention to the fact that the service agreement was never formally
extended as contemplated by clause 2.2 thereof when it came to its natural expiry in September 2004. On all the evidence it seems
clear that there were no changes whatsoever in the practical terms and conditions under which the plaintiff worked and was
remunerated immediately before the termination date specified in the service agreement and immediately thereafter. The work which
he did, the pay and conditions to which he was entitled and received, and all other aspects of his employment continued as if nothing
had changed. In those circumstances, and in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, it seems to me that the only inference
to draw from those facts is that the implied agreement of the parties was to the effect that there would be no material change in the
defendant’s terms of employment save that he could no longer be bound by the fixed period of the service agreement (such a fixed
period having expired). His contract must, therefore, necessarily be taken to be one which could have been terminated only on
reasonable notice or otherwise in accordance with the written terms of the service agreement. Subject only to that necessary
modification I am satisfied that all of the terms and conditions which applied prior to the expiration of the service agreement were
continued in force immediately thereafter and thus continued in force up to the date of termination of Mr. Purdy’s employment. It is
also noteworthy that clause 2.2 speaks of the possibility of renewal “in any September during the course of this agreement and
thereafter” (my emphasis) until notice is given. The agreement itself, therefore, contemplates its continuance after the termination
date until notice of termination.
16. I am therefore satisfied that as of the date of that termination the terms of the service agreement and in particular the terms of
the anti competition clause remained operative.
Enforceability
17. The final issue which arises is as to the extent to which the non-competition clause may be said to be enforceable having regard
to the well established principles concerning contracts in restraint of trade. A restraint on a person working or being engaged in one
or more lines of business is by definition a restraint of trade. It is well settled that such a term will not be enforced by the courts
unless it meets a two fold test:-
(a) it is reasonable as between the parties; and
(b) it is consistent with the interests of the public
McEllistrom v. Ballymacelligot Co-op (1919) AC 548 at p. 562.
18. In relation to the first test i.e. reasonableness inter partes, in the leading case of Stenhouse (Australia) Ltd. v. Phillips [1974]
A.C., 311, Lord Wilberforce said:-
“The proposition that an employer is not entitled to protection from mere competition by a former employee means that
the employee is entitled to use to the full any personal skill or experience even if this has been acquired in the service of
his employer: it is this freedom to use to the full a man’s improving ability and talents which lies at the root of the policy
of the law regarding this type of restraint. Leaving aside the case of misuse of trade secrets or confidential information …
the employer’s claim for protection must be based upon the identification of some advantage or asset inherent in the
business which can properly be regarded as, in a general sense, his property, and which it would be unjust to allow the
employee to appropriate for his own purposes, even though he, the employee, may have contributed to its creation”.
19. The test seems to be, therefore, as to whether in all the circumstances of the case both the nature of the restriction and its
extent is reasonable to protect the goodwill of the employer. Clearly certain clauses which preclude solicitation come within that
definition provided that they are not excessively wide. In certain other cases clauses have been upheld which have prohibited
employees setting up a similar business within a specified distance of an employer’s establishment. See for example Marian White
Limited v. Francis (1972) I WLR 1423. But it is clear that the duration of the prohibition and the geographical scope of same are
important matters to be considered having regard to the nature of the work in question and the structure of the business.
20. In Halsbury 4th Ed., Vol. 47, the authors note in para. 31 that where a business is carried on by a small number of people and
with customers widely distributed, a very large area will be allowed and a wider restraint may be reasonable in a business carried on
by agents or correspondence than in one necessitating constant attendance in person. For example, all of England was regarded as
an acceptable area of restriction for an accountant in Isitt & Anor. –v- Ganson [1899] 43 Sol. Jo. 744.
21. Having heard the evidence presented on behalf of the plaintiff as to the nature of the business in Ireland I am satisfied that there
are only 10 (or perhaps 11 if one includes the defendant) patent attorneys operating in Ireland and that they all operate from Dublin.
No difficulty would appear to be encountered in servicing the demands of the Irish business from Dublin. In those circumstances it
does not seem to me that a geographical restriction based upon the jurisdiction of the Irish state is unreasonable having regard to the
way in which the business operates in Ireland.
22. Having regard to the specialised nature of the business I am also satisfied that a period of 12 months is not unreasonable.
23. However, it is also clear that a more restrictive view is taken of covenants by employees than is taken of covenants given on sale
of a business. Covenants against competition by former employees are never reasonable as such. They may be upheld only where the
employee might obtain such personal knowledge of, and influence over, the customers of his employer as would enable him, if
competition were allowed, to take advantage of his employer’s trade connection. Kores Manufacturing Co. Ltd. –v- Kolok
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1959] Ch. 108.
24. In those circumstances I have come to the view that the prohibition in this case on all competition is too wide. A prohibition on
dealing with (in addition to soliciting of) customers of the plaintiff would, in my view, have been reasonable and sufficient to meet any
legitimate requirements of the plaintiff. The wider prohibition which restricts dealing with those who might be, but are not, such
customers is excessive.
25. There may be types of business where it is not practical to distinguish between customers and non-customers. This is not one of
them. On the evidence, the number of customers is small and identifiable. A prohibition on dealing with those identified customers
would be sufficient to prevent the defendant taking advantage of the plaintiff’s trade connections. The wider restriction which
prohibits competing for business in which the plaintiff might have an interest but where the client was not an existing customer, could
not be directed to that end but to the wider aim of restricting competition as such. As pointed out in Kores that is not a permissible
end.
26. In those circumstances I must view the anti-competition clause as an unreasonable restraint of trade. On that basis I must
determine the preliminary issue by finding that the anti-competition charge, while applicable, is unenforceable.