Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
IECCA 137 ECLI:IE:CCA:2005:137 KI-generiert

Court dismisses appeal for leave to certify that prison release does not trigger statutory destruction of fingerprints.

Geschäftsnummer IECCA 137
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Irland (IE)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Abgewiesen (Dismissed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the destruction of fingerprints. The applicant argued that his release from custody, which he claimed was a discharge of proceedings, required the Gardaí to destroy the biometric records taken during the initial investigation. The court determined that a prison Governor lacks the authority to discharge proceedings and that the specific circumstances did not fall within the statutory provision mandating record destruction. Consequently, the court found no point of law of exceptional public importance to warrant an appeal.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

s. 8(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967; A release by a prison Governor does not constitute a discharge of proceedings under the Act, and the specific facts do not create a point of law of exceptional public importance requiring Supreme Court certification.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
Criminal Procedure Act 1967 destruction of records discharge of proceedings prison Governor authority leave to appeal exceptional public importance biometric evidence

Zitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen

KI-generiert

Zitierte Rechtsprechung

KI-generiert
Miranda v Arizona
In the United States in the case of Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S.
Lavery v Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station
In Lavery v Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390 the

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Volltext

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

70/03

McCracken J

O’Neill J

White J

Between:

The People at the Suit of the Director

of Public Prosecutions

Respondent

AND

Yu Jie

Applicant

Judgment of the Court delivered by Mr Justice McCracken on the 25th day of

November 2005

___________________________________________________________

This is an application on behalf of the Applicant pursuant to s.29 of the Courts of Justice Act

1924 seeking an order from this Court granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Section 29 reads as follows:-

“The determination by the Court of Criminal Appeal of any appeal or other matter

which it has power to determine shall be final, and no appeal shall lie from that

court to the Supreme Court, unless that court or the Attorney-General shall certify

that the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that

it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme

Court, in which case an appeal may be brought to the Supreme Court, the decision

of which shall be final and conclusive.”

Counsel for the Applicant have put forward three separate matters which they argue come

within this section. The Court proposes to deal with them separately.

1 The first question raised is where an accused person who is under interrogation by the

gardaí and has been advised as to his right of silence, and who asserts such right of silence,

should the gardaí under those circumstances cease to question him any further?

In the United States in the case of Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 it has been held that if an

individual indicates prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the

interrogation must cease. No authority in the Courts of this State or of any part of the United

Kingdom, or indeed of the European Court of Human Rights has been put forward to support

this proposition.

In Lavery v Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390 the

Supreme Court have already decided that the right of interrogation exists. O’Flaherty J said

at page 395:-

“However, the gardaí must be allowed to exercise their powers of interrogation as

they think right, provided they act reasonably. Counsel for the State submitted to

the High Court Judge that in effect what Mr MacGuill was seeking was that the

gardaí should give him regular updates and running accounts of the progress of

their investigations and this was going too far. I agree. The solicitor is not entitled

to be present at the interviews. Neither was it open to the applicant, or his solicitor,

to prescribe the manner by which the interviews might be conducted, or where.”

What is being sought by the Applicant in the present case goes much further than the matters

being sought in that case, and this Court considers that the question has already been decided

by the Supreme Court in the Lavery judgment.

In any event, if the Applicant’s contention was correct, it would render nugatory the

provisions of s.4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 which permits the detention of a suspect in

circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case for the proper investigation of an

offence. Clearly the purpose for which he may be detained is to allow him to be interrogated

and questioned, and this Court is quite satisfied that the rights of such person is protected by

the advice as to the right of silence, and it is always open to a person arrested under s.4 to

exercise such right, as the Applicant did in the present case. This Court is quite satisfied that

the point raised had already been decided by the Supreme Court and does not come within

s.29.

2 The Applicant also seeks to raise a question in relation to the use of interpreters by the

gardaí when questioning an accused person. It is suggested that the accused’s solicitor and an

interpreter of his own choosing should be present under those circumstances. This Court is

quite satisfied, firstly that that situation is covered by the decision already quoted in the

Lavery case, and secondly that the issue raised is purely a question of fact to be determined

by the trial Judge in the first instance, possibly in a voir dire hearing, and ultimately to be

determined by the jury. In the present case the jury was made well aware of the allegations

and it was a matter for them to determine whether the interrogation of the Applicant and any

statement made by him was in any way prejudiced due to possible errors by the interpreter.

The Court is quite satisfied that no question of law arises under those circumstances.

3 The final matter put forward is of a more technical nature. In the present case the gardaí

were in possession of certain finger print and palm print evidence. Section 8(1) of the

Criminal Justice Act 1984 provides:-

“Every photograph (including a negative), fingerprint and palm print of a person

taken in pursuance of the powers conferred by section 6 and every copy and record

thereof shall, if not previously destroyed, be destroyed as this section directs.”

Section 8(3) reads:-

“Where proceedings have been so instituted and the person is acquitted or

discharged or the proceedings are discontinued, the destruction shall be carried

out on the acquittal, discharge or discontinuance.”

The Applicant here was initially arrested and charged with murder on 12th March 2001. On

his arrest finger prints and palm prints were taken. On 5th October 2001 an order was made

sending him forward to the Central Criminal Court. Judicial review proceedings were taken

by the Applicant as a result of which, on 4th July 2002, the order sending him forward was

quashed. On 4th July 2002 the Applicant was released from custody by the Governor of

Cloverhill Prison and was re-arrested the following day, re-charged and against sent forward

for trial. He was ultimately tried on the same charges as were in the original charge sheet and

under the same charge sheet numbers.

It is argued on behalf of the Applicant that his release on 4th July 2002 resulted in the

original charge sheets becoming spent and that his re-arrest amounted to new proceedings

against him. Under those circumstances it is argued that the earlier proceedings, in the course

of which the prints were taken, had been discontinued and the gardaí were under a duty to

destroy the prints which were in their possession. Alternatively it was argued that the release

of the accused amounted to a discharge within the meaning of the section. In either case the

gardaí would then have been in unlawful possession of the prints at the time of the trial. The

Applicant argues that this is a question of the construction of the section, which in turn is a

question of law of exceptional public importance.

This point relies very much on its own particular facts, and it is of considerable relevance to

note that the Applicant was released, not by a direction of the Director of Public

Prosecutions or of the gardaí, but apparently by the Governor of the prison. An argument

was sought to be made that the Governor was part of the prosecution machinery, and

therefore a discharge by the Governor amounted to a discharge by the Director of Public

Prosecutions. This Court cannot accept that argument. Quite clearly the Governor of a prison

has no power whatsoever either to discontinue proceedings against an accused or to

discharge the accused in the sense that that word is used in s.8. It may well be that the

Governor exceeded his authority in releasing the accused but that does not in any way bring

him within the section, or invalidate the original charges against him.

The accused was ultimately tried and convicted on foot of the original charges brought

against him, in the course of the investigation of which the relevant prints were taken. This

Court is quite satisfied that the circumstances of this case could not bring him within s.8 and

is satisfied that there is no point of law to be certified to be argued in the Supreme Court.

Accordingly this application is dismissed.