Court dismisses appeal for leave to certify that prison release does not trigger statutory destruction of fingerprints.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the destruction of fingerprints. The applicant argued that his release from custody, which he claimed was a discharge of proceedings, required the Gardaí to destroy the biometric records taken during the initial investigation. The court determined that a prison Governor lacks the authority to discharge proceedings and that the specific circumstances did not fall within the statutory provision mandating record destruction. Consequently, the court found no point of law of exceptional public importance to warrant an appeal.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generierts. 8(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967; A release by a prison Governor does not constitute a discharge of proceedings under the Act, and the specific facts do not create a point of law of exceptional public importance requiring Supreme Court certification.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertZitierte Rechtsprechung
KI-generiertVolltext
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
70/03
McCracken J
O’Neill J
White J
Between:
The People at the Suit of the Director
of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
AND
Yu Jie
Applicant
Judgment of the Court delivered by Mr Justice McCracken on the 25th day of
November 2005
___________________________________________________________
This is an application on behalf of the Applicant pursuant to s.29 of the Courts of Justice Act
1924 seeking an order from this Court granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 29 reads as follows:-
“The determination by the Court of Criminal Appeal of any appeal or other matter
which it has power to determine shall be final, and no appeal shall lie from that
court to the Supreme Court, unless that court or the Attorney-General shall certify
that the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that
it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme
Court, in which case an appeal may be brought to the Supreme Court, the decision
of which shall be final and conclusive.”
Counsel for the Applicant have put forward three separate matters which they argue come
within this section. The Court proposes to deal with them separately.
1 The first question raised is where an accused person who is under interrogation by the
gardaí and has been advised as to his right of silence, and who asserts such right of silence,
should the gardaí under those circumstances cease to question him any further?
In the United States in the case of Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 it has been held that if an
individual indicates prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. No authority in the Courts of this State or of any part of the United
Kingdom, or indeed of the European Court of Human Rights has been put forward to support
this proposition.
In Lavery v Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390 the
Supreme Court have already decided that the right of interrogation exists. O’Flaherty J said
at page 395:-
“However, the gardaí must be allowed to exercise their powers of interrogation as
they think right, provided they act reasonably. Counsel for the State submitted to
the High Court Judge that in effect what Mr MacGuill was seeking was that the
gardaí should give him regular updates and running accounts of the progress of
their investigations and this was going too far. I agree. The solicitor is not entitled
to be present at the interviews. Neither was it open to the applicant, or his solicitor,
to prescribe the manner by which the interviews might be conducted, or where.”
What is being sought by the Applicant in the present case goes much further than the matters
being sought in that case, and this Court considers that the question has already been decided
by the Supreme Court in the Lavery judgment.
In any event, if the Applicant’s contention was correct, it would render nugatory the
provisions of s.4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 which permits the detention of a suspect in
circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case for the proper investigation of an
offence. Clearly the purpose for which he may be detained is to allow him to be interrogated
and questioned, and this Court is quite satisfied that the rights of such person is protected by
the advice as to the right of silence, and it is always open to a person arrested under s.4 to
exercise such right, as the Applicant did in the present case. This Court is quite satisfied that
the point raised had already been decided by the Supreme Court and does not come within
s.29.
2 The Applicant also seeks to raise a question in relation to the use of interpreters by the
gardaí when questioning an accused person. It is suggested that the accused’s solicitor and an
interpreter of his own choosing should be present under those circumstances. This Court is
quite satisfied, firstly that that situation is covered by the decision already quoted in the
Lavery case, and secondly that the issue raised is purely a question of fact to be determined
by the trial Judge in the first instance, possibly in a voir dire hearing, and ultimately to be
determined by the jury. In the present case the jury was made well aware of the allegations
and it was a matter for them to determine whether the interrogation of the Applicant and any
statement made by him was in any way prejudiced due to possible errors by the interpreter.
The Court is quite satisfied that no question of law arises under those circumstances.
3 The final matter put forward is of a more technical nature. In the present case the gardaí
were in possession of certain finger print and palm print evidence. Section 8(1) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1984 provides:-
“Every photograph (including a negative), fingerprint and palm print of a person
taken in pursuance of the powers conferred by section 6 and every copy and record
thereof shall, if not previously destroyed, be destroyed as this section directs.”
Section 8(3) reads:-
“Where proceedings have been so instituted and the person is acquitted or
discharged or the proceedings are discontinued, the destruction shall be carried
out on the acquittal, discharge or discontinuance.”
The Applicant here was initially arrested and charged with murder on 12th March 2001. On
his arrest finger prints and palm prints were taken. On 5th October 2001 an order was made
sending him forward to the Central Criminal Court. Judicial review proceedings were taken
by the Applicant as a result of which, on 4th July 2002, the order sending him forward was
quashed. On 4th July 2002 the Applicant was released from custody by the Governor of
Cloverhill Prison and was re-arrested the following day, re-charged and against sent forward
for trial. He was ultimately tried on the same charges as were in the original charge sheet and
under the same charge sheet numbers.
It is argued on behalf of the Applicant that his release on 4th July 2002 resulted in the
original charge sheets becoming spent and that his re-arrest amounted to new proceedings
against him. Under those circumstances it is argued that the earlier proceedings, in the course
of which the prints were taken, had been discontinued and the gardaí were under a duty to
destroy the prints which were in their possession. Alternatively it was argued that the release
of the accused amounted to a discharge within the meaning of the section. In either case the
gardaí would then have been in unlawful possession of the prints at the time of the trial. The
Applicant argues that this is a question of the construction of the section, which in turn is a
question of law of exceptional public importance.
This point relies very much on its own particular facts, and it is of considerable relevance to
note that the Applicant was released, not by a direction of the Director of Public
Prosecutions or of the gardaí, but apparently by the Governor of the prison. An argument
was sought to be made that the Governor was part of the prosecution machinery, and
therefore a discharge by the Governor amounted to a discharge by the Director of Public
Prosecutions. This Court cannot accept that argument. Quite clearly the Governor of a prison
has no power whatsoever either to discontinue proceedings against an accused or to
discharge the accused in the sense that that word is used in s.8. It may well be that the
Governor exceeded his authority in releasing the accused but that does not in any way bring
him within the section, or invalidate the original charges against him.
The accused was ultimately tried and convicted on foot of the original charges brought
against him, in the course of the investigation of which the relevant prints were taken. This
Court is quite satisfied that the circumstances of this case could not bring him within s.8 and
is satisfied that there is no point of law to be certified to be argued in the Supreme Court.
Accordingly this application is dismissed.