Court orders eviction for genuine demolition intent where tenant offers to vacate but cannot be done without possession.

[*201] 1980 Feb.8

(ORPHANIDES, S.D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

Christina Evangelou Panayi now Zononos and Another,

Applicants,

v.

Georghios Panayi Pitsillos,

Respondent.

(Rent Application No.680/78).

Christina Evangelou Panayi now Zenonos and Another,

Applicants,

v.

Demetrios Gregoriou,

Respondent.

(Rent Application No.681/78).

Landlord and tenant - Statutory tenancy - Recovery of possession - Premises reasonably required by the landlord for demolition - Section 16(1)(h) of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law 36/75) - Landlord’s intention to demolish premises genuine - Demolition cannot be done without obtaining possession of the premises - Compliance with provisions of above section - Partial demolition not possible in the circumstances of this case - Order for recovery of possession made.

A. Ladas, for the Applicants.

A. Angelides, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:

ORPHANIDES, S.D.J.: These two applications [*202] in which I shall deliver a single judgment are related to premises comprising of two shops.

One of these shops had been occupied by Georghios Panayi Pitsillos, respondent in Application No. 680/78, for the purpose of carrying on the business of a dry-cleaner, whereas the other one had been occupied by Demetrios Gregoriou, respondent in Application No. 681/78, who described himself as an auto-electrician.

The shop in the occupation of the respondent in Application No. 680/78 consists of two inter-communicating rooms. One of these rooms is very old and is constructed with mud bricks, whereas the other one is made of cement blocks.

The premises, the subject-matter of these proceedings, form part of a building complex which is erected upon plot 78, Sheet/Plan XXI/61 & 62, Block C. at Strovolos. Originally, this plot, as well as plot 93, belonged to the applicants jointly with their mother. However, on 23.11.76 the mother transferred her share in these plots to the two applicants, who became thus the joint owners of the plots in question, in equal share.

The property of the applicants is situated along Strovolos Avenue and is affected by a street alignment scheme which has been imposed by the appropriate authority on 20.9.74 under Notification No.1403. The line of the alignment is shown on the Site Plan [*203] (Exhibit 1) with a red line and the part of the applicants’ property which is affected by the alignment scheme is coloured yellow and green.

By an agreement made between the applicants and the Republic of Cyprus, in or about October, 1977, the applicants agreed to cede to the public road a substantial part of their said property (coloured green, yellow and red on the plan) for the “purpose of straghtening and widening of Strovolos Avenue upon which the property abuts. In consideration of the above the Republic agreed to grant to the applicants a portion of equal extents to the one ceded by them to the public road from a nearby Government land adjacent to the applicants’ property. The portion of the land so granted to them by the Government forms part of the river-bed and it is coloured blue on the Plan (Exhibit 1).

It is a material term of this agreement that the applicants shall demolish all structures standing upon the portion of the property agreed to be ceded to the public road within three years from the day of the notification to them of the decision of the Council of Ministers.

On or about 21.11.77 the Director of the Lands District Office of Nicosia notified the applicants that the Council of Ministers, approved the exchange of the properties as aforesaid, and informed them that he has been authorised to transfer to them the government land [*204] so granted to them under the agreement, upon condition that all structures standing upon the ceded property be demolished.

In view of the above, the applicants claim that the premises now occupied by the Tenants are reasonably required by them for the purpose of demolition, and pray for an order of eviction.

The respondents deny that the applicants are entitled to the order applied for, and in their separate Statements of Defence, which are almost identical they allege as follows:-

(a) That the intention of the

applicants is to evict the tenants without paying to them any compensation and/or without granting to them of a new tenancy in case the new building

shall comprise any business premises, and that such intention may be inferred from the following circumstances:-

(i) That the applicants by

their letter dated 21.1.78 (Exhibit 10) demanded possession of the premises relying on the provisions of S.16(1)(i) & (j) of Law

36/75.

(ii) That on 23.3.78 they reverted to their demand for possession invoking this time S.16(1)(h) of the said Law.

(iii) That on 21.4.78 the applicants obtained by improper means a permit from the Improvement [*205] Board of Strovolos for the demolition of the buildings and which formed the subject of Recourse No. 176/78.

(iv) That the applicants by false representations attempted to obtain possession of the premises from the wife of the Respondent in Application No. 681/78.

(v) That the negotiations for the granting to them of a new tenancy or for the payment to them of reasonable compensation for giving up possession, broke down due to the fault of the applicants.

(b) That the applicants were not acting in good faith.

(c) That the decision of the Council of Ministers for the exchange of the properties as aforesaid was taken without making any provision for the protection of the respondents as statutory tenants of the premises.

(d) That by the proposed exchange of properties the applicants will derive on the one hand substantial pecuniary benefits, whereof on the other hand the respondents will suffer irreparable loss.

(e) That the applicants’ intention regarding the proposed development of the property, is not clear in case they are successful, as no reference is made in their Statement of Claim to any [*206] existing plans for the reconstruction of the premises.

(f) That the applicants may comply with the terms of the agreement made with the Republic, by demolishing only that part of the premises which lies within the area affected by the street alignment scheme.

With the exception of the general denial that the premises are not reasonably required by the applicants for the purpose of demolition and perhaps of the last ground under para (f) above-mentioned, all the other grounds of opposition put forward by the respondents are, in my opinion, without merit and tend to confuse the issue in hand. I have found in particular the allegation of the respondents that the applicants’ intention is to get an order of eviction against them without paying to them any compensation, the least, I would say, shallow, because it is the Court and not the landlord who is called upon to decide whether compensation should be paid to tenants for the loss of occupation of the premises.

Section 17 of the Rent Control Law provides that the Court may require, the landlord to pay in a proper case, such sum as would appear to the Court to be sufficient to compensate the tenant for the loss of the occupation of the business premises. And it is up to the tenant to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is entitled to such a compensation. In other words, it is [*207] up to the tenant to establish a claim for compensation under the Section and such a claim cannot form the subject of discretion on the part of the landlord.

From the evidence adduced, it appears to me that such a claim is not part of the respondents’ case as they have failed to adduce any evidence to establish that they are entitled to compensation in case an order is made against them. In fact there is no evidence at all that any good will is attached to the premises in question increasing the rental value of same and that by reason of giving up possession of the premises the landlords shall get the benefit from such increase whilst the respondents shall suffer a loss. At any rate, there is no counterclaim for any compensation under the Section and the complaints of the respondents on this issue are wholly unacceptable. It may be added in this respect, that respondent in Application No. 680/78, the drycleaner, has tried to persuade the Court that if he had to move his business to other premises, he will not only lose the flow in trade, but he would also have to bear high removal expenses, which he estimated at £1,500.- I must admit that I have failed to understand whether these allegations were intended to establish a claim of compensation under s. 17 or to prove hardship under the general issue of reasonableness.

I feel that these allegations were not aiming at any of the above two targets, because (a) They are [*208] not consistent with the requirements of section 17 whereby compensation is recoverable and (b) because the question of hardship is only relevant in cases brought under Section 16(1)(g) of the Law, and in my opinion, this is not one of those cases.

If authority is needed, the following

decision is relevant:- Anastasia Kontou v. A.Solomou (1978) 1 C.L.R. 425.

The respondents are also complaining that the intention of the applicants is to evict them from the premises without granting to them a new tenancy. It Is a fact that the applicants came to Court without any architectural plans for the reconstruction of the premises. Of course there is nothing in the Law requiring them so to do since their intention is to demolish the premises occupied by the Tenants and their application for the recovery of the premises is founded upon this ground.

Learned counsel for the applicants explained that his clients could not possibly have proper plans prepared before the exchange of the properties is completed and before they are certain as to the extent and the boundaries of their plot in view of the agreement with the Government.

I find the explanation of counsel, logical and irrespective of any argument to the contrary, it must be admitted that the reconstruction of the premises is [*209] closely connected with the implementation of the agreement with the Government and with the formalities that may be associated with the use of land which in the decision of the Council of Ministers is described as “River-bed”.

I have no doubt at all, that the intention of the applicants to reconstruct the premises is genuine and it should be sought not only upon their desire so to do, but also upon principles of good business management and of sound economies. In this respect, I have to point out, that the applicants should be credited at least with some intelligence in protecting their interests.

From the evidence adduced, I have been impressed that they are seriously minded to proceed with the demolition and the reconstruction of their premises, as soon as they overcome their difficulties and as soon as the exchange of the properties with the Government is completed. In such a case, I am of the view, that the respondents may claim the grant to them of a new tenancy as of right, a right which undoubtedly leaves no room for the exercise of any discretion on the part of the Landlords.

I, therefore, find the insinuations made by the other side that the intention of the applicants is tainted with bad faith aiming at unjustly evicting them from the premises wholly unsubstantiated and unacceptable.

It was further suggested by the respondents that the proposed exchange of properties between the applicants [*210] and the Republic will cause to them irreparable loss, whilst at the same time the applicants will unjustly be enriched.

With all due respect to the sugestion, I find the position of the applicants and the manner in which they are pursuing their interests .understandable and perfectly legal and in my opinion the tenants cannot be held complaining about the manner the applicants propose to develop their property, nor do they have a right to dictate to the applicants the way they should exploit their plots. The condition imposed by the Council of Ministers, for the demolition of the structures standing upon the portion of the land to be ceded to the road, is reasonable and beneficial not only for the applicants but also for the public in general. This consideration, in my opinion, together with the desire of the applicants to develop their property in the manner described before the Court outbalances completely the objection of the respondents which I consider as unreasonable, vindictive and detrimental to the interest of the applicants.

I am further of the opinion that the Council of Ministers were under no obligation to make any provision in the agreement for the protection of the tenants, as suggested, because the rights of the respondents as statutory tenants are fully protected by SS.17 & 18 of the Law, provided that they can establish a case under there provisions.[*211]

I felt I was bound to make this extensive reference to the various allegations put forward by the respondents not because I consider them relevant to the issue, but in order to appreciate better their contentions regarding the legal aspect of the case.

The application is based on S.16(1)(h) of the Rent Control Law (Law 36/75) which reads as follows:-

16 - (1) No judgment or order for the recovery of possession of any dwelling house or business premises to which this Law applies, or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, shall be given or made except in the following cases:

………………………………………

“(h) where the dwelling house or business premises are reasonably required by the landlord for the substantial alteration or reconstruction thereof in such a way as to affect the premises, or for the demolition thereof, and the Court is satisfied that the landlord has, where necessary, obtained the necessary permit for such alteration, reconstruction or demolition and has given to the tenant not less than three months’ notice in writing to vacate the premises;”

Learned counsel for the respondents, in his written address, referred to the interpretation given to [*212] this section by the Supreme Court in the cases of Anastasia Kontou v. Antonis Solomou (1978) 1 C.L.R., p.425, and Andreas Yerasimou v. A. Rousoudiou, (1974) 1 C.L.R., p. 197, and submitted that before an order for ejectment is made against a tenant under the section the landlord must prove -

(a) that the applicant is the owner of the property,

(b) that he has obtained the necessary permit where necessary for the reconstruction or demolition of the premises,

(c) that he has given to the tenant not less then 3 months’ notice in writing to vacate the premises, and

(d) to prove further to the satisfaction of the Court that the premises are reasonably required for their substantial alteration, reconstruction or for the demolition thereof.

I am in agreement with counsel that this is the correct approach to the issue in hand. Counsel, however, submitted that the applicants have not satisfied the requirements of the section, and, therefore, he said, they are not entitled to the order applied for. Specifically, he argued, that the applicants failed to produce their title deed, and proving thus that they are the owners of the properties under consideration. I do not think that the submission of counsel holds water. If counsel was more careful he would have remembered that the D.L.O. clerk, [*213] Mr. Vrahimis Andreou, who gave evidence for the applicants, stated that the plots upon which the premises are standing, are registered in the name of the applicants. Furthermore, I wish to remind counsel that in the Statement of Defence prepared by him, it is admitted that the plots upon which the premises in question as well as other premises are standing, are the property of the applicants. In para 3(b) of the statement of defence it is expressly stated

that:- “Αι αιτητρίαι από τινός χρόνου είναι εξ αδιαιρέτου ιδιοκτήται των τεμαχίων 78 και 93 του

Συμπλέγματος ‘C’ είς Στρόβολον, εφ’ ών ευρίσκονται και άλλα υποστατικά.”

Counsel also submitted that the applicants failed to prove that they have obtained the necessary permit for the demolition of the premises and that Exh.7 which purports to be a demolition permit is not in true fact the necessary permit within the meaning of the Section. It is obvious that the submission of counsel is founded upon condition (b), of the Exhibit which provides that the demolition should be made without prejudice to the rights of the tenants, if any.

Learned counsel for the respondents tried to make capital out of the condition and submitted that it was inserted in the permit intentionally, after a previous demolition permit issued by the Improvement Board of Strovolos, on the ground that the premises were in a “dilabitated state”, has been successfully challenged by the Respondents before the Supreme Court.[*214]

It must be observed here, however, that the permit referred to by counsel was issued by the Board on different considerations and by virtue of powers vested on the Board by a different branch of the Law.

We are concerned here, with the Rent Control Law which regulates the relations between Landlord and Tenant, and the permit Exh.7, before the Court, must, therefore, be considered in the light of the provisions of this Law. On the other hand, it must be conceded, that the rights of’ a Tenant cannot be adequately protected by a condition inserted in a demolition permit, but by the Law itself; and, in this respect, it may be said, that the condition in question is superfluous.

Because, I can think of no other rights of the Tenants which the condition in question intended to protect, other than those conferred upon Tenants by the Rent Control Law, extensive reference of which has already been made in other parts of this judgment.

The intention therefore, of the Board cannot be interpreted as an attempt to curtail the rights of the owners of the property by inserting superfluous and perhaps meaningless conditions.

With reference to the demolition permit, Exh. 7, counsel further complained that the plans referred to therein have not been produced so that the extent of the premises intended to be demolished may be appreciated. It [*215] is possible he said, that the demolition permit relates only to part of the premises and not to the whole complex. In this respect, I have to observe that there is nothing in the permit which is ambiguous and ought to be clarified by plans. The permit was granted in clear and unambiguous terms and was issued in respect of the demolition of all structures standing upon Plot No. 78. The complaints are therefore completely unfounded.

Before proceeding to another aspect of the case, I have to remark that the respondents did not include in their statement of defence any of the above issues as intended grounds of opposition and that the question of the ownership of the premises as well as the attack upon the validity of the demolition permit were raised for the first time in the final address by counsel. To my mind this is not only an unfair course to the other side; but also to the Court. Nevertheless, those issues, being legal, have not been left unconsidered, by me, but I must confess I have found them to be, for all the reasons I have endeavoured to advance, without substance and untenable.

Be that as it may, I shall now proceed to consider the main ground of opposition put forward by the respondents, namely - That the premises are not reasonably required by the Applicants for the purpose of demolition.[*216]

As I explained earlier, the

applicants are claiming under sect. 16(1)(h) of the Rent Control Law (Law 36/75) recovery of possession of the premises on the ground that they are

reasonably required by them for the purpose of demolition.

With reference to this section, the Learned President of the Supreme Court in the case of Anastasia Kontou v. Antonis Solomou (supra), said at page 428:-

“A corresponding, but not identical and not fully analogous, provision in England is section 30(1)(f) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954; and case-law in relation of that provision, such as Fisher v. Taylors Furnishing Stores Ltd (1956) 2 All E.R. 78, Fernandez v. Walding, (1968) 1 All E.R. 994 and Health v. Drown (1972) 2 All E.R. 561, shows that the notion of ‘reasonable requirement’ in a case of a claim of possession for the purpose of substantial alteration or reconstruction is linked only to whether or not it is reasonable for the Landlord to obtain possession for that purpose having regard to the nature and extent of the proposed alteration or reconstruction…..”

In the case of Fisher abovementioned the Landlords intended to undertake the demolition of the premises for which it was necessary to obtain possession, to rebuilt on the site, and to occupy the new buildings for the purpose of their business as furniture retailers. Lord Denning [*217] stated as follows at page 80:-

“The Court must be careful to see that section 30(1)(f) is fully satisfied before it allows the Landlord to get possession. For this purpose the Court must be satisfied that the intention to reconstruct is genuine and not colourable; that it is a firm and settled intention, not likely to be changed; that the reconstruction is of a substantial part of the premises; that the work is so extensive that it is necessary to get possession of the holding in order to do it……”.

In the. same case Lord Parker said at p. 84 ……. He (the landlord) must prove not only that he intends to demolish or reconstruct as there set out, but also that he could not reasonably do so without obtaining possession of the holding’!’

He further stated after dealing with para (f) of the Act: -

“From the scheme of the Act as there laid down I should have thought that it was clear, apart from authority, that, if any of those grounds of objection is established, the Tenant’s application for a new lease must fail. Each ground is entirely separate and independent, and each, if proved, entitles the Landlord to succeed. Thus, if the ground specified [*218] in para (f) is proved to the satisfaction of the the Court, it matters not what use the Landlord ultimately intends to put the holding. He may intend to let it when the work is done to a third party; he may intend ultimately to occupy it himself for his own business; or he may not have made up his mind at all”.

It appears to me clear, that these judicial pronouncements were adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Andreas Yerasimou v. Andreas Rousoudhiou (1974) 1 C.L.R. 167, in which it was stated at pp. 112-113:-

“Now looking at the terms of s.10(1)(h) (now section 16(1)(h) of Law 36/75) we are of the view that if any one of those grounds are established, the Landlord’s application for recovery of possession must succeed if the Court is satisfied that the Landlord where necessary obtained the necessary permit, because each ground is entirely separate and independent and which if proved entitles the Landlord to succeed. If Authority is needed, we think we can derive sufficient guidance from the case of Fisher v. Taylors Furnishing Stores Ltd. etc………”

The same views were also expressed in a recent decision in the case of Michaelides v. Tacovides (1979), C.L.R. Part II March-April p.123.

Hadjianastassiou J., in delivering the [*219] Judgment of the Court said at the bottom of page 132:-

“…… it was clear that the Landlord reasonably required the shop in question and that the proposed works to be carried out were of substantial alteration affecting the premises; and the Landlord could, not reasonably do so without obtaining possession of the shop in question. From the scheme of the Act, as there laid down, we think that it was clear, apart from Authority, that, once anyone of those grounds were established, the Landlord could succeed.”

As I have said in another part of this Judgment I have no doubt at all that the applicants are seriously minded to demolish the premises in question and that their intention so to do is firm and genuine. A good and concrete indication of the genuineness of their intention is the incident whereby the applicants started the demolition of the premises, but they were prevented from completing the demolition by an order of the Supreme Court obtained at the instance of the respondents. It should be noted here that the applicants proceeded with the demolition of the premises simply relying upon a permit issued to them by the Improvement Board of Strovolos.

The question therefore to be asked is whether the applicants can demolish the premises, without obtaining possession of the holding.[*220]

The answer to the question should be in the negative, because I cannot imagine how can the demolition of the whole or part of the complex be carried out whilst the Tenants are in possession. To my mind if follows inevitably that the demolition of the premises could not in reason be done with the Tenants in possession.

Nevertheless, learned counsel for the respondents contended that this is possible. In particular, he alleged that it is not necessary for the applicants to demolish the whole complex and that they may comply with the condition imposed by the Council of Ministers as aforesaid, by demolishing only that part of the premises that is affected by the street alignment scheme, I think the allegation of counsel amounts to a submission that the demolition of the premises could reasonably be done without disturbing the possession of the Tenants. However, what I think counsel really meant to say in this connection, is that the Respondents are not objecting to the demolition of the part of the premises, hereinabove mentioned, on condition that the reconstruction of the remainder part of the premises is being undertaken by the applicants for the occupation of the Respondents, a measure which, according to the evidence of their own experts would involve an expenditure on the part of the applicants.

Before considering the legal consequences of this submission I wish to say a few words regarding some side-issues raised by the Respondents in connection with [*221] the costs of the reconstruction of the premises, and the extent they affected by the street alignment scheme.

With reference to the question of costs the evidence came solely from the side of the respondents.

Mr. Theodossiades, the Respondents’ architect, estimated the costs of the reconstruction of the premises at £4,000.- whereas Andreas Charalambous, a post-office clerk, estimated such a cost to be as low as £200.- £300.- It was really amusing listening to a post-office clerk testifying about matters in respect of which he appeared to have no personal knowledge or positive views.

At first, he appeared to be under the impression that all that it was necessary for the reconstruction of the premises was the erection of a cheaply made wall. However, when he came to appreciate the nature and extent of the works necessary to be done he admitted that they would entail a cost of not less than £3,000.-

The Respondents further attempted to minimise the importance of the street alignment scheme and the extent it affects the premises. In this connection they adduced evidence to prove -

(a) That the line of the street alignment appearing on the D.L.O. plan, Exh. 1, before the Court has been wrongly placed there.

(b) That Mr. Criton Georghiades, a civil engineer, [*222] who testified for the Applicants has wrongly accepted it as a basis for his calculations, and

(c) That the extent of the premises that is affected by the street alignment is much less than the one appearing on his plan, Exh. 11.

The evidence for the Respondents on this issue came from Mr. Theodosiades, who prepared his own plan, Exhibit 12 before the Court.

The line of the alignment, as accepted by him is shown on his plan in a black dotted line and the part of the premises that is affected by it is shown by the letters Aoo and Boo. In arriving at these conclusions, the witness said, that he relied mainly upon the building line of the premises in plot 59.

I do not consider it necessary to make a finding on this issue. Suffice it to say that the premises are substantially affected by a street alignment scheme; and that the part of the Applicants’ property which Is affected by it, has been precisely described in the D.L.O. plan attached to the agreement made with the Government. At any rate, that is the portion of the Applicants’ plot which they have agreed to cede to the public road and in respect of which they have undertaken the obligation to demolish all structures standing thereon.[*223]

On the other hand I must admit that the evidence of Mr. Theodosiades did not impress me at all and I do not hesitate to say that I have found his testimony wholly unconvincing and unreliable.

Reverting to the legal aspect of the submission, I am of the opinion, if maintainable, that the Court may be required under the circumstances to make an order –

(a) Requiring the respondents to evacuate and deliver up vacant possession only of that part of the premises occupied by the Respondents, that may be found standing within the portion of the Applicants’ property agreed to be ceded to the public road,

(b) Permitting the Landlords to interfere with a substantial part of the premises whilst the Tenants would remain in occupation of the remainder,

(c) Directing the Applicants to undertake, at their own expense, the reconstruction of the part of the premises so retained by the Respondents.

I have considered the submission made with great care and I have given due consideration to all matters raised by learned counsel for the Respondents.

I confess, with the utmost respect, that I find the proposals put forward by the Respondents on this issue unrealistic preponderous and unfair to the Landlords. In particular, I find the argument of counsel to the effect that only part of the premises should be demolished [*224] without the Tenants’ moving out wholly untenable and unacceptable.

I hold the view that the Court cannot issue an order for part eviction, particularly when such part eviction would entail the creation of an obligation on the part of the Applicants to incur high and unreasonable expenses.

The Respondents further suggested that they are ready and willing to permit the Landlords to enter upon the premises for carrying out the intended works of demolition and reconstruction and offered to grant to them all necessary facilities for that purpose.

This concession appears at first sight to be very generous but I very much doubt the motives of the Respondents. I cannot help feeling that this offer is not genuine and that it was only put forward with the intention of disarming the Landlords in the pursuit of their rights. Moreover, if such an offer is a genuine one, in my opinion, is not only impracticable, but also untenable in Law as it was held in the case Wittingham v. Davies and another, (1962) 1 All E.R. p. 195.

In that case it was held -

“The fact that the Tenant offered to grant whatever facilities were necessary to enable substantial work to be done by the Landlords if tenant were granted new tenancy, did not justify the conclusion that the Landlords could reasonably carry out the [*225] work without obtaining possession; and accordingly, the tenant was not entitled to a new tenancy”.

Lord Evershed in delivering the judgment of the Court after referring to the tenants’ evidence that he would give all necessary facilities for the work to be done, stated the following at page 199, letter D.

“……. I

do not find it necessary to go at length into this evidence. The question: What is the test, is not one, I think, that requires

much exposition. The language of Sect. 30(1)(f) is that the Landlord ‘could not reasonably do the work without obtaining possession’. I conceive that that must mean, ‘could not reasonably do it as a matter of right without obtaining possession’. The section cannot, I think, have contemplated that it might be well and good if the Tenant chose to give unspecified facilities, lasting for a considerable time.”

The submission, therefore, that the demolition of the premises could reasonably be done without disturbing the possession of the Tenants must fail.

In the light of all the above and regard having had to the evidence as a whole, I am perfectly satisfied that the Applicants earnestly intend to demolish the premises, which, clearly, cannot reasonably be done without obtaining possession of the holding.

I am also satisfied that the Applicants have [*226] obtained the necessary permit for the demolition of the premises and that they have given to the Respondents/Tenants the required notice in writing to vacate the premises.

In conclusion I hold and I so find, that they have brought their case within the provisions of the section and that they are, therefore, entitled to the order applied for.

For all the above reasons I issue an order of eviction against each Respondent separately as claimed individually in each Application, with of execution until 30.6.1980.

With regard to the question of costs

I have to observe that the Respondents by raising so many unnecessary and irrelevant matters have not only confused the issues but they have

also prolonged the proceedings unnecessarily. I therefore, consider it just and fair to make the following order as to costs.

Each Respondent to pay individually £50.- towards the costs of’ the Applicants.

Order Accordingly.

Order of eviction with order for costs as above.