Court rejects literal interpretation of requisition orders, ruling they apply only to abandoned properties.

[*11] 1978 Dec.14

(PIKIS, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LARNACA

Hussein Siret,

Plaintiff,

v.

Zenon Constantinou,

Defendant.

(Action No. 486/77).

Statutes - Construction - Whether to be interpreted literally or by having regard to their objects.

Turkish Cypriot Properties - Requisition of – Requisition Orders+ - Interpreted according to their general objects - And application of, limited to persons who had abandoned their properties, following the Turkish invasion, and not to other citizens of the Republic who continued using them either personally or through authorised agents.

A. Arghyrides, for the Plaintiff.

A. Andreou, for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

PIKIS, P.D.C.: The plaintiff, a Turkish Cypriot, [*12] is a Government officer, posted to the Cyprus High Commission in London since the year 1963. He is the owner of a house at Larnaca. The defendant moved into occupation of this house in September 1975 and remained in occupation for a period of 18 months. There is only one succinct question I must resolve and that is whether this house was among the properties requisitioned by virtue of the requisition orders made in 1975, under Nos. 671 and 820 (1975 Official Gazette, Part II, pages 611, 779). If the answer is in the negative it is agreed that plaintiff suffered damages amounting to £216 occasioned from loss of use of the property for which the defendant is accountable.

The Requisitioning of Turkish Cypriot Properties

After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus there followed a massive displacement of population that caused, apart from unprecedented human misery, the abandonment of many pieces of immovable property. The Government of Cyprus, in its desire to safeguard such properties from the hazards of abandonment and provide at the same time a means for the relief of the housing problems of the refugee population, decreed on 11th September 1975 to requisition movable and immovable property belonging to Turkish Cypriots who had been moved to the north in areas occupied by the Turkish army. It is common ground that plaintiff’s property was not covered by the terms of this order for the plaintiff never abandoned his property nor had he left his base in the southern part of the island.

In November 1975 a requisition order was made [*13] supplementary to the September order providing for the requisition of all movable and immovable properties belonging to Turkish Cypriots not

personally used by them “μη προσωπικώς χρησιμοποιουμένη ύπ’ αυτών”. In the contention of the defendant inasmuch as the plaintiff was

not personally using the property, the aforesaid house at Larnaca became subject to the terms of the aforesaid requisition order notwithstanding the absence of any intention on his part to abandon his property. Counsel for the plaintiff argued to the contrary and submitted that the two orders must be read in conjunction limiting the effect of both orders to properties abandoned by Turkish Cypriots when they had been moved to the north. I must confess that my immediate reaction to this submission was favourable. However counsel for the defendant raised forceful arguments to the contrary and laid stress on the grammatical meaning of the word “personally” in the supplementary requisition order. The aim of the Government was not, as he submitted, to deprive Turkish Cypriots of the use of their property but to guard against possible abuse making feasible, at the same time, the compensation of dispossessed owners in accordance with the provisions of the Requisition of Property Law 21/62. (See also 50/66.)

Statutory Interpretation - Recent Trends

I have given close attention to the rival submissions and studied recent judicial trends in the interpretation of statutes. It would be idle to disagree with [*14] the suggestion that prima facie on a literal interpretation of the provisions of the requisition order, notably the word “personally”, the property of the plaintiff would be caught by the provisions of the November requisition order. However, such a result would defeat, in part, the object of the decision to requisition Turkish Cypriot properties, which lay, inter alia, in the protection of abandoned properties. There is a rising judicial trend to pay increasing importance to the objects of a statute or regulation when interpreting its provisions. (See Attorney-General v. H.R.H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) A.C. 436, 461, 473.) This approach vindicates Blackstone who argued centuries ago that a broad view should be taken of the context of a statute. (See Blackstone v. Bentham (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 516, 521.). The disinclination of the Courts to limit judicial interpretation to the narrow limits of the literary rule is particularly marked when the result likely to be achieved thereby may lead to absurd or manifestly unjust results. The way out from such a dark alley is to adopt an interpretation consonant with the general objects of a regulation provided this is reasonably possible, that is to say attainable without doing violence to the specific part of an enactment under consideration. This was the approach recommended by as eminent a Judge, if I may say so with respect, as Lord Wilberforce in Vandyk v. Oliver (1976) 1 All E.R. 466.

He puts the matter in this way:-

“…… and I rest on the principle that if one possible interpretation of a statute leads to a [*15] result contrary to the evident general purpose one should prefer to it is an interpretation also reasonably possible which does not lead to such a result.” (p.471 letter ‘B’.)

In a subsequent decision Lord Denning was prepared to break further ground and recommended that a Court should, in every case, adopt a construction that is likely to promote the general legislative purpose underlying a statutory provision. Reflecting on the implications of Continental methods of statutory interpretation he advised that “…. we should do well to throw aside our traditional method and adopt a more liberal attitude”. (See James Buchanan &

C. Babco (1977) 1 All E.R. 518, 523, letter E.)

Reverting to the two requisition orders their general object appears to be the requisition of properties abandoned by Turkish Cypriots who moved to the north and not the requisition of properties of Turkish Cypriots who remained in occupation of their properties personally, or through agents. It would thus be reasonable and in accord with the object of the two requisition orders to limit the application of the provisions of the supplementary requisition order to persons who had abandoned their properties following the Turkish invasion and not to other citizens of the Republic. Such interpretation would not only achieve the general object of the requisition orders, and be in accord with fundamental requirements of the law, but would prevent manifest injustice. In accordance with this [*16] interpretation the properties of Turkish Cypriots who moved to the north were properly requisitioned and the owners cannot exploit their properties through agents, something that might conceivably give rise to abuse, whereas citizens of the Republic, be they Greeks or Turks, who did not abandon their properties remain unaffected by this order and can continue using their properties either personally or through authorized agents.

Hence judgment is given for the plaintiff for the sum of £216. There shall be no order as to costs. I have departed from the general rule that costs follow the event on a consideration of two factors: (a) the fact that defendant may have been misled, by obscure drafting to believe that the property had been properly requisitioned; and (b) the fact that defendant has carried out repairs in the property to the value of £152.

Judgment for plaintiff for £216.- with no order as to costs.

+ Notification Nos. 671 and 820 of Supplement No. 3 of the Official Gazette dated 11.9.1975 and 14.11 1975, respectively.