Court allows appeal against disqualification order for dangerous driving death but upholds imprisonment sentence.

[*2033] 1974 March 6

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, A.LOIZOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Sherif Kiamil,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No.3551).

Criminal Law – Sentence – Casing death by want of precaution through dangerous driving - Section 210 of the Criminal Code Cap. 154 - Three months’ imprisonment and twelve months’ disqualification - Judicial notice of great loss of life caused nowadays by dangerous driving - Sentence of imprisonment neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle - Disqualification order - Personal circumstances of appellant - He should not have been prevented from driving, after he will come out of prison, for any further period, by means of a disqualification order - Said order renders overall punishment, in this particular case, manifestly excessive

- Set aside.

Disqualification Order - Whether such order should not be made when imprisonment is imposed - See. also, under “Criminal Law”.

Causing death by want of precaution

- Section 210 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154- Sentence - Imprisonment and Disqualification See, also, under “Criminal Law”.

M. Aziz with E. Ulunay, for the Appellant.

A. Franges, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant has appealed [*2034] against the sentence imposed on him by the District Court of Paphos in respect of the offence of causing death contrary to section 210 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment as from January 29, 1974, and he was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of twelve months.

The loss of life occurred as a result of a violent collisions on the wrong side of the road in so far as the appellant was concerned.

Taking judicial notice of the great loss of life caused nowadays by dangerous driving, such as that in the present case, and having in mind, inter alia, the case of Rex v. Guilfoyle,

(1973) 2 All E.R. 844, we are of the view that the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial judge is neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle, and, therefore, we refuse to interfere with it.

It is correct that in the case of The Attorney-General v. Iacovides, (Cr. A. 3530, not reported yet*) we found that it was not necessary to impose a sentence of imprisonment in relation to causing death contrary to section 210 of Cap. 154, and that an order of disqualification was sufficient; but, of course, each case has to be dealt with on the basis of its own merits and the Iacovides case is clearly distinguishable, in view of its own particular circumstances, from the present case.

What has presented us with some difficulty was how to approach the other part of the sentence, namely the disqualification order. We do not intend at all to [*2035] lay down a rule, that when imprisonment is imposed in a case of this nature then there should not he made a disqualification order, too; it is a matter to he decided in the light of the circumstances of each particular case: and in the present case we cannot lose sight of the fact that the appellant is a professional lorry-driver, fifty-one years old, married, the father of six children, four of whom are still supported by him, and that till now he has had a substantially unblemished driving record, as his only previous conviction, in this respect, is one for careless driving in 1972 which, as is clearly indicated by the sentence then imposed, must have been an offence of not at all a serious nature.

We do not, therefore, think that the appellant should have been prevented from driving, after he will come out of Prison, for any further period, by means of a disqualification order. We are of the view that the disqualification order renders the overall punishment, in this particular case, manifestly excessive.

This appeal is, therefore, allowed to the extent of setting aside the disqualification order; the sentence of imprisonment is to run from the date on which it was imposed.

Appeal partly allowed.

* Now reported in (1974) 5 J.S.C. 610.