Conviction quashed due to lack of expert evidence required to interpret brake marks for speed determination.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Supreme Court allowed the appellant's appeal against his conviction for driving without reasonable consideration for other road users. The trial judge convicted the appellant based on police testimony regarding the length and distinctiveness of brake marks, asserting they 'spoke fluently for themselves' to prove excessive speed. The court held that without expert evidence explaining the correct significance of these marks in the specific circumstances, it was unsafe for the trial judge to form an opinion on speed, leading to the quashing of the conviction.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generiertSection 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332; In the absence of expert evidence explaining the correct and full significance of brake marks, a trial judge cannot safely form an opinion on speed based solely on their length and distinctiveness.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertVerwandte Entscheide
KI-generiertVolltext
[*1527] 1972 July 28
(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, MALACHTOS, JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Michael HjiGeorghiou,
Appellant,
v.
The Police,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3354).
Road Traffic - Conviction for driving without reasonable consideration for other road users - Contrary to section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 - Based on a finding of excessive speed - Brake marks - Trial judge’s finding based on Police Constables evidence about "length" and "distinctiveness" of brake marks - Not safe for trial judge to form an opinion regarding speed, on the basis of the brake marks, in the absence of expert evidence explaining the correct and full significance of brake marks – Conviction quashed.
Brake marks - Absence of expert evidence explaining their correct and full significance.
Z. Katsouris, for the Appellant.
N. Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant appeals against his conviction, by the District Court of Nicosia, on a count charging him with driving a motor vehicle without reasonable [*1528] consideration for other persons using the road, contrary to section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap.332.
We would like to point out that in the light of the facts of this case the appellant could have been convicted of the said offence only if it were found that he had been driving without due careand attention, because there was no other conduct on his part which could have been treated as amounting to lack of reasonable consideration for other road users; we think, therefore, that in a case such as the present one the better course was to charge the accused directly with driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention.
The appellant, on the 7th May, 1971, while driving his motor car, No.EU602, collided with another motor car, No. FB643, which entered the avenue from a side road; the trial Court convicted the appellant on the ground that he drove at excessive speed… by far more than 30 miles per hour at the cross-roads in question.
This conclusion of the trial Court was based primarily on the fact that as a result of the application of the brakes by the appellant there were left brake marks 43 feet long before the point of impact and 13 feet and 6 inches long after such point; according to the evidence of the police constable who investigated the case the brake-marks were at the beginning "light" and at the end "more distinct", indicating that the appellant applied at first the brakes "lightly" and later with "more strength". The trial judge says in his judgment that these brake marks "speak so fluently for themselves". [*1529]
We are unable to agree with the above view of the trial judge: As no expert evidence has been adduced in order to explain the correct and full significance of the said brake .marks in the light of the particular circumstances of this case, we are of the view that it was not safe for the trial judge to form any distinct opinion on the basis thereof regarding the speed at which the appellant was driving at the material time; and since the appellants conviction was, as stated, based on the finding that he was driving at an excessive speed we have to set aside the conviction and the sentence imposed as a result thereof.
Appeal allowed.