Court of Appeal dismissed appeal against careless driving conviction as trial judge's findings were supported by evidence.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Court of Appeal dismissed George Rologhis's appeal against his conviction for careless driving under Section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law. Rologhis argued his trial judge's findings were against the weight of evidence, claiming the collision resulted solely from the motorcyclist's speeding. The court held that unless the record shows trial judge findings are unsatisfactory, the Supreme Court will not disturb them, concluding the judge's decision was open to the evidence.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generiertSection 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law; Unless the appellant can show from the record that the findings of the trial Court are unsatisfactory and cannot be sustained, this Court will not disturb them.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertZitierte Rechtsprechung
KI-generiertVerwandte Entscheide
KI-generiertVolltext
[*1277] 1972 January 21
(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., A. LOIZOU, MALACHTOS, JJ. )
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
George Rologhis,
Appellant,
v.
The Police,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3312).
Road Traffic - Careless driving - Section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 - Appellant’s vehicle crossing road in a diagonal way and colliding with motor-cycle coming from the opposite direction - Conviction - Appeal - On the ground that the findings of the trial Court upon which the conviction was based were against the weight of evidence - Court of Appeal not persuaded that such findings are unsatisfactory - Appeal dismissed.
A. Myrianthis, for the Appellant.
A. Frangos, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: This is an appeal [*1278] against the conviction of the appellant on a count charging him with driving a motor-car without due care and attention, contrary to section 6 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: On the 20th January, 1971, in the late afternoon, the appellant was driving along Roosevelt street in Limassol in order to go to his bakery, which was on the right-hand side of the street in relation to the direction in which he was driving. When the appellant was approaching the bakery he had to pull up behind a lorry which was stationary ahead of him and then he drove across the street, in a more or less diagonal way, towards the entrance of the bakery. At that moment he collided with a motor-cyclist who was coming from the opposite direction.
The learned trial judge after examining, in a very thorough manner, all the material before him reached the
conclusion that the appellant was guilty as charged, because he failed to notice in time the motor-cyclist who was coming from the opposite direction and, also, because he drove across the street while the motor-cyclist was very close to his motor-car.
Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the findings of the trial Court upon which the conviction of the appellant has been based are against the weight of the evidence. He contended that his client had not been guilty of any negligence at all and that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of the motor-cyclist who was speeding down the street. [*1279]
In Kotziapashi v. The Police, (1967) 2 C.L.R. 149, the Supreme Court had to deal with an appeal against conviction which was based,as in the present instance, on the ground that the conviction was against the weight of evidence; Vassiliades, P., said in his judgment (at p. 151): "Unless the appellant can show from the record that the findings of the trial Court are unsatisfactory, and cannot, therefore, be sustained, this Court will not disturb them". In Lambides v. The Police, (1967) 2 C.L.R. 142, the conviction was attacked on the ground that the findings of the trial judge were un satisfactory in the light of the evidence on record; Vassiliades, P., in dismissing the appeal stated (at p. 148) that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it was open to the trial judge to find as he did on the evidence before him.
In the present case we have not been persuaded by appellant's counsel that the findings of the trial judge, on which the conviction has been based, are unsatisfactory and, on the contrary, we are of the view that they were open to him on the evidence before him.
In the light of the foregoing this appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.