Legislator Rechtsprechung & Gesetzgebung
Costas G. Economides v. The Police (1972) JSC 493 KI-generiert

Supreme Court quashes conviction for driving without due care where victim stepped on road near car with no chance to avoid accident.

Geschäftsnummer Costas G. Economides v. The Police (1972) JSC 493
Gericht / Behörde
Rechtsordnung Zypern (CY)
Entscheiddatum
Ausgang Gutgeheissen (Allowed)

Legislator-Zusammenfassung

KI-generiert

The Supreme Court allowed the appellant's appeal and quashed his conviction for driving without due care and attention. The trial judge found guilt based on the narrow road width and the point of impact, but the appellate court noted the victim stepped onto the road when the car was so close that the driver had no chance to avoid the collision. Since there was no evidence of speeding or other negligence, the court held the facts did not prove the appellant was guilty of the charged offence.

Legislator-Regeste

KI-generiert

Road Traffic Act; Driving without due care and attention: Conviction quashed where victim stepped on road when vehicle was so near that driver had no chance to avoid accident, and no evidence of speeding or other negligence existed.

Schlagwörter

KI-generiert
driving without due care road traffic offence conviction quashed no chance to avoid vicarious liability criminal appeal evidence of negligence übersetzte Geschwindigkeit
KI-generiert

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Volltext

[*493] 1972 May

(STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOU, MAJA CHTOS, JJ. )

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Costas G. Economides,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No. 3337).

Road Traffic - Driving without due care and attention - Conviction - Complainant stepping on the road when car was so near him that driver had no chance of avoiding the accident - No facts or circumstances tending to prove that appellant was guilty of offence of which he was convicted - No evidence of speeding - Conviction quashed.

S. Erotokritou, (Mrs.), for the Appellant.

V. Aristodemou, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

STAVRINIDES, J.: At about 7.20 a.m. on November 4 last a car driven by the appellant along Strovolos Avenue, [*494] Strovolos, collided with a boy of about eleven years named Andreas. In connection with that accident the appellant was charged with, and convicted of, driving without due care and attention.

A policeman called as a witness by the prosecution who arrived on the scene a few minutes after the accident, said that the point of impact was one foot four inches from the near-side edge of the road; and from his evidence about a scratch on the near-side front door it appears that the part of the vehicle that collided with the hoy was that door. Two boys aged respectively eleven and twelve years, also called as witnesses for the prosecution, gave evidence to the effect that Andreas was hit "as soon as he set foot" on the road on his way to the other side. This evidence tallies with that of the policeman and means that Andreas stepped on the road when the car was so near him that the appellant had no chance of avoiding the accident.

In finding the appellant guilty the learned trial judge said:

"Bearing in mind all facts and circumstances and in particular the width of the road and that of accused’s vehicle and the point of impact being one foot four inches away from the edge of the road as well as the clear vision of visibility and its range I find as positive the fact that accused failed to take any precautionary measures and he brought about this accident". [*495]

We are unable to see how the "facts and circumstances" specified in the passage prove, or tend to prove, that the appellant was guilty of the offence of which he was convicted. For the rest there was no evidence of speeding, and we cannot think what other "facts" or "circumstances" the learned trial judge regarded as supporting a finding of guilt.

Learned counsel who appeared for the Republic stated that he was unable to support the conviction, and we can only say that that was the proper thing to do.

For the above reasons the conviction is quashed.

Appeal allowed.