Criminal appeal dismissed as no reason shown for interference with trial judge's sentence.
Legislator-Zusammenfassung
KI-generiertThe Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against an eighteen-month prison sentence for theft committed as an agent. The appellant argued for leniency based on mitigating circumstances and social reports, but the court found no sufficient grounds to intervene. The decision rests on the principle that the trial judge holds primary responsibility for sentencing, and appellate courts will only interfere if a clear error or lack of reason is demonstrated.
Legislator-Regeste
KI-generiertSections 255 and 270(b) of the Criminal Code Cap. 154; The primary responsibility for measuring sentence rests with the trial Court, and this Court will only interfere on appeal if sufficient reason for doing so is shown.
Schlagwörter
KI-generiertZitierte Gesetzesbestimmungen
KI-generiertZitierte Rechtsprechung
KI-generiertVerwandte Entscheide
KI-generiertVolltext
[*270] 1971 March 3
(VASSILIADES, P., JOSEPHIDES, STAVRINIDES, JJ. )
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Pavlos Leandrou,
Appellant,
v.
The Police,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3219).
Criminal law - Sentence - Eighteen months' imprisonment for stealing by agent - Sections 255 and 270(b) of the Criminal Code Cap. 154 - Appeal - No reason shown for interference with sentence - Appeal dismissed.
Sentence - Primary responsibility for measuring sentence rests with the trial Court - Principles on which Court of Appeal will interfere with sentence.
Sentence - Social Investigation Reports - Very valuable in connection with sentence.
Sentence - Institutional treatment - Reformation.
D. Papachrysostomou, for the Appellant.
M. Kyprianou, Counsel for the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:
VASSILIADES, P.: After hearing counsel for the appellant on the contents of the reports (the social investigation report dated the 11th December, 1970; and the prison social progress report, dated the 27th February, 1971), now on the record, we are confirmed in our view that such reports are very valuable in connection with sentence.
In the circumstances of this case and in the light of the reports now before us, we are unanimous in the opinion [*271] that no reason has been shown for intervention by this Court with the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
The appellant, a young man of 26 years of age, was convicted in the District Court of Limassol upon his own plea of guilty, for the offence of misappropriating the sum of £24.450 mils which the appellant collected as the agent of his foreman who had authorised the appellant to collect his wages for him, when the appellant would be collecting his own pay.
About a month later the appellant returned the money to the complainant; but this is only a circumstance which can go towards mitigation. It does not affect either guilt or the moral turpitude involved in the commission of the offence.
Before passing sentence in this case, the trial judge was requested by counsel for the defendant to take into consideration under section 81 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, another outstanding case against him for the larceny of fifty packets of cigarettes valued at £7.075 mils, which the appellant committed about two months after the offence charged in this case. For both these offences the trial judge, after taking into consideration what counsel on behalf of the appellant had to say in mitigation (including the fact that the accused is a married man with two minor children), found himself forced to the conclusion that the proper sentence was one of imprisonment; and imposed on the appellant a term of 18 months. [*272]
As repeatedly stated by this Court, the primary responsibility for measuring sentence rests with the trial Court; and this Court will only interfere On appeal, if it is shown that there is sufficient reason for doing so. As we have already said, no such reason has been shown in this case; and this appeal must be dismissed. (See Michael Kougkas v. The Police (1968), 12, J.S.C. 1453 at 1455).
We can have no doubt that one of the fundamental considerations that the trial judge had in mind in imposing this sentence was the institutional treatment of the defendant with a view to his reformation. The reports before us confirm that institutional treatment has already had its beneficial effect on the appellant. In the hands of the proper authorities one can reasonably expect that the appellant shall derive still more benefit from his cooperation with the prison authorities; and when they are satisfied that he may be trusted with the responsibility of keeping on the right track, the authorities will, no doubt, use the machinery which will put the appellant on the test; continuing, as it is regularly done, to watch and assist him after release from prison. This, however, is a matter entirely in the hands of other authorities. As far as the appeal is concerned, it has to be dismissed; with directions that the sentence will run from the date of conviction.
Appeal dismissed.
Directions accordingly.