Criminal appeal dismissed; sentence for dangerous speeding upheld as not manifestly excessive.

[*949] 1968 September 3

(VASSILIADES, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, STAVRINIDES, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Costas Zachariades,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No. 3027).

Criminal Law - Sentence - Driving a motor-car at a dangerous speed, contrary to section 4(1) (2) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap.

332 - Sentence of fine with a disqualification order - Appeal on the ground that sentence imposed by trial Court is manifestly excessive in the circumstances - Sentence not interfered with by Court of Appeal.

A. Triantafyllides with Chr. Chrysanthou, for the Appellant.

M. Kyprianou, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by: -

VASSILIADES. P.: This is an appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed by the trial Court is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case.

The Appellant, a mechanic of 36 years of age, was charged in the District Court of Nicosia for driving a motorcar at a dangerous speed contrary to section 4(l)(2) of the Motor-Vehicles and Road Traffic Law (Can. 332). Counsel on his behalf entered a plea of guilty to the charge upon which the appellant now stands convicted. [*950]

The facts of the case, as presented to the trial Judge, were that the policeman checking the traffic at Grivas Digenis Avenue at 10.00 p.m. in the evening of May 3, 1968, found with the assistance of radar equipment that the appellant was driving his car at a speed of 65 miles per hour in an area within the speed limit is 30 miles per hour.

The mitigating circumstances pleaded on behalf of the appellant, were that the traffic on the avenue in question, at the time of the offence, was such that driving at 65 miles per hour could not really be described as dangerous driving, and that finding was due to sub-section (2) of section 4. of Cap. 332. There was no traffic congestion at that hour of the night on the well-illuminated and broad avenue in question. Moreover, counsel pleaded that his client whose profession makes it necessary for him to drive powerful cars very frequently on the road, had only one previous conviction more than 15 years ago, for which he was fined £3 for over speeding.

The trial Judge in passing sentence took into consideration that the speed at which the appellant was driving at the time of the offence, was more than double the speed limit in the area in question; and that the appellant must have been well aware that he was exceeding that limit. In the circumstances the learned Judge took the view, as it e appears from his notes, that a fine would not be an adequate punishment; and passed on the appellant a sentence of £30 fine with a disqualification order for 40 days.

Having heard learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submission that, in the circumstances, the [*951] sentence is manifestly excessive and having also heard counsel for the respondents in support of the sentence, we are unanimously of the opinion that the sentence imposed cannot he considered as manifestly excessive; and it should not he interfered with.

Appellant’s main grievance is that the disqualification order in his case is a very severe punishment as the B use of his driving licence is necessary for the carrying out of his profession. On the other hand we cannot overlook the fact that a disqualification order is, in most cases, a more effective punishment than a fine; and the this was apparently what the Judge had in mind in making use of disqualification for checking offences of this nature, which, in his view, according to his notes, constitute a public danger. We are inclined to agree with the view that disqualification for an appropriate period in the circumstances of the case, should he more frequently used as part of the punishment for such offences, in view of its undoubted deterrent effect.

Having considered the matter as a whole, we have reached the

conclusion, as already stated, that we should not interfere with the sentence; and that his appeal must he dismissed.

Appeal dismissed, sentence affirmed.

Order in terms.