Court dismissed appeal holding that a professional photographer's studio is a shop under the Shop Assistants Law.

[*190] 1968 March 8

(VASSILIADES, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES,JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Michael Geadis,

Appellant.

v.

District Labour Officer,

Respondent.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2990).

Shop - Offences contrary to the Shop Assistants Law, Cap. 185 - Photographer's shop - A “shop” within section 2 - "Retail trade or business" within section 2.

Words and Phrases – “Shop” and "retail trade or business" in section 2 of the Shop Assistants Law, Cap. 185.

A. Paikkos, for the Appellant.

S. Georghiades, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

VASSILIADES, P.: This is an appeal against conviction by the District Court of Nicosia for failing to close his shop on a Saturday afternoon contrary to the provisions of the Shop Assistants Law (Cap. 185) specified in the charge; for failing to keep a Register of protected persons, contrary to the relative provisions of the Children and Young Persons Law (Cap.178); and for failing to exhibit in his shop a list of the names and working hours of his shop assistants, contrary to the requirements of section 11 of the Shop Assistants Law (Cap. 185). [*191]

The appellant is a photographer who takes photographs at a charge, at

his usual place of work in Nicosia. He describes himself as a master photographer, specialising in portrait photography.

He was prosecuted as a shopkeeper who failed to comply with the statutory provisions referred to in the charge, which apply to all persons within the definition of a shopkeeper in the statute.

His defence is that he is beyond the reach of the statute in question because he is not an ordinary photographer but an artist of skill and taste engaged in the pursuit of art, and not engaged in a retail trade or business within the statute.

The trial Judge after hearing evidence, which stands mostly uncontested, came to the conclusion that the artistic element claimed by the appellant for his work could not take his case outside the reach of the statute; and convicted the appellant on all three counts in the charge.

In arguing the appeal before us learned counsel conceded that an ordinary photographer's shop or place of business is a "shop” within the provisions of the statute; but submitted, that appellant's studio is not a "shop” because he is not carrying there, any trade or business. Appellant’s work, counsel submitted, is that of an artist and not that of a shopkeeper.

Interesting as the submission may be, in our opinion the case presents no difficulty. It turns on the construction of the statutory provisions in

question. If the case were to be decided merely on the definition of the [*192] expression "retail trade or business" in section 2, there might, perhaps,

be an arguable case for the appellant; but if the relevant statutory provisions are construed in their context in the statute taken as a whole, no difficulty arises in their construction. The second schedule to the statute, which is a schedule under the proviso to section 6, and forms part of the statute, contains photography as a trade or business exempted from Sunday closing under the section.

In view of this provision in the enactment, it cannot be said that the legislator did not intend to include photography as a retail trade or business within the provisions of the statute. The legislator expressly put photography within the statute. And photography, artistic or non-artistic, when practised as a profession is a trade or business within this statute.

After arriving at this conclusion, one must inevitably come to the next which is that appellant’s premises is a "shop" within the definition of the statute, horrid as such a conclusion may appear to the appellant as an artist.

On the facts of the case as they are on record, the appellant cannot escape the reach of the statutory definitions. They are wide enough to cover his place of business even if that is an artist photographer’s studio as he calls it. This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal which must fail and be dismissed. Order accordingly.

Appeal dismissed.