Appeal dismissed; trial judge's settlement comments on credibility did not violate natural justice.

[*147] 1968 January 12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CYPRUS

ON APPEAL AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

(VASSILIADES,P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Michael Ahapittas,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Roc-Chik Ltd.,

Respondent-Plaintiff.

(Civil Appeal No. 4644).

Natural justice - Appeal - Violation of rules of natural justice - Trial Judge’s observations in chambers before conclusion of Case, with a view to settlement.

Advocates - Evidence - Affidavit evidence - Practice of affidavits sworn by parties' advocates, in support of clients' case, deprecated.

A. Pantelides, for the Appellant.

E. Odysseos, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

VASSILIADES. P.: This is an appeal from the Judgment

of the District Court, Nicosia, in action No. 128/67 (Registry of Morphou) , awarding respondent-plaintiffs their claim for

£105 value of goods sold and delivered, plus interest and costs; and dismissing appellant's counter claim for £100, value of a refrigerator alleged to have been sold to the respondents.

The appeal is taken on the rather unusual ground of violation of the rules of natural justice at the trial through the trial Judge expressing himself regarding the credibility of the appellant after hearing his evidence-in-chief and before the conclusion of the case.[*148]

In support of the appeal, appellant’s advocate filed an affidavit to the effect that after his client’s examination in chief a discussion followed in the Judge's chambers with a view to settlement when the trial Judge expressed his opinion as to the credibility of the appellant. Respondent’s advocate filed his own affidavit in opposition where he gave his version of what happened at that stage of the proceedings.

This Court has had occasion to deprecate more than once the practice of affidavits sworn by the parties’ advocates in support of their client’s case. The reasons why such steps in Court proceedings are undesirable, unless indispensable are so obvious that we find it unnecessary to say more about it. This case demonstrates once more such reasons.

After hearing appellant’s advocate this morning, we considered it unnecessary to call on the respondent.

It is obvious from the totality of the material before us that when the trial Judge, allegedly, expressed an opinion about the credibility of the appellant, the Judge was not referring at all to appellant’s credibility as derived from his demeanour as a witness before him, but the Judge merely pointed out that in view of past correspondence it would be difficult to give credit to a material part of appellant’s version; and the Judge did so in the course of a discussion with a view to settlement.

When the discussion with a view to settlement in the Judge’s chambers failed to achieve its purpose, the hearing proceeded as usual in open Court, without counsel[*149] for the appellant taking any formal objection on the ground of the Judge being biased. The parties called all their evidence and addressed the Court thereon as usual. The trial Judge then reserved Judgment sine die and delivered a considered Judgment about three weeks later, which he read in open Court. The Judgment is on the record and speaks for itself. Both the claim and the counter claim were carefully considered and the evidence adduced on both sides was sufficiently analysed and duly assessed. There is nothing in the Judgment to lend any support to the contention for irregularity as suggested in the notice of appeal. We are unanimously of the opinion that there is no merit whatsoever in this appeal, considering especially what took place at the trial after the alleged irregularity.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Order in terms.